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Notes and Comment
Alien Enemy: Status of alien enemy as litigant: Partnership
containing alien enemy as plaintiff.-The recent case of Rodriguez v.
Speyer Brothers, [igi9] A. C. (Eng.) 59, presents a very interesting
development in the common law of England with reference to the
rights of an alien enemy litigant. In that case the plaintiffs were
members of a partnership composed of two British subjects, two
American citizens, and a citizen of Germany there residing. Upon
the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany the firm of
Speyer Brothers was ipso facto dissolved.' Speyer Brothers there-
upon commenced to wind up its affairs and instituted this action to
collect a debt due to the partnership. The defendant set up as a
defense the fact that one of the partners was an enemy alien then
residing in Germany. The House of Lords held, by a majority of
one, that the rule that an alien enemy, resident in the enemy's coun-
try, cannot bring an action during the continuance of the war, is not
unqualified and will not be applied in a class of cases manifestly not
within the mischief at which the rule was aimed, or where to prevent
an alien enemy to become a party to an action as plaintiff would do
much more harm to British subjects, or to friendly neutrals than to
the enemy. In thus applying a rule of reason, the court relied upon
two decisions which had' already made incursions into the general
rule. In the first of these cases2 the plaintiffs were an English com-
pany and a German company, and the action was brought for the
infringement of a patent of which they were the joint owners. Under
an agreement made before the outbreak of the war, the English com-
pany was to have the sole right of bringing actions for the protection
of patent rights. It was held that to deny the English company the
right to prosecute this action would be to deny the right to a British
subject to bring an action for his own benefit. In the language of the
court: "To hold that the doctrine of disability applies to a case in
which an enemy alien cannot during the war reap any benefit from
the action and where the action is really for the benefit of the other
partners, would, I think, involve a misconception of the principle and
extent of the rule, and before the Trading with the Enemy Amend-
ment Act, 1916, might have inflicted very serious loss upon British
subjects. In these cases the substance of the matter must be looked
at." In the second of these cases,3 the action was brought by the
'The outbreak of war ipso facto dissolves all partnerships of which a non-resident
alien enemy is a member. The attitude in which partners become placed as anta-
gonist enemies not only renders impossible such amicable communication as is
necessary to the carrying on of partnership business, but is obviously inconsistent
with it, the objects and ends of partnerships being generally the jbint applitation
of the skill, labor, and enterprise of all the partners as well as their funds.
McAdams v. Hawes, 9 Bush (Ky.) 15 (1872); Small v. Lumpkin, 28 Grat. (Va.)
832 (1877).2Mencedes Dainler Motor Co. and Dainler Motoren Gesellschaft v. Mausdlay
Motor Co., 31 Times L. R. (Eng.) 178 (1915).3Rombach v. Gent, 31 Times L. R. (Eng.) 492 (1915).
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receiver of a partnership, one of the members of which was a non-
resident enemy alien. The court said: "The receiver brought the
action under the protection of the court. It was true that he had to
join his two partners, but it was the receiver's action in substance and
it was impossible to say that it was brought for the benefit of a firm,
one of whom was an alien enemy."
In the United States there is no doubt that, as a general rule, an
alien enemy cannot bring an action as plaintiff, though he may, of
course, be made a defendant. 4 But it should be borne in mind that
this disability applies only to non-resident alien enemies. The test
of the right to sue which has universally been adopted is residence, and
not nationality, where-the alien is, and not what he is.' In Clark v.
Morey6 a case which has been widely cited in support of this proposi-
tion, Chief Justice Kent said: "Aliens resident in the United States
at the time of war breaking out between their own country and the
United States, or who came to reside in the United States after the
breaking out of such war, under an express or implied permission, may
sue and be sued, as in time of peace; and it is not necessary, for that
purpose, that such alien should have letters of safe conduct, or actual
license to remain in the United States, but a license and protection will
be implied, from their being suffered to remain, without being ordered
out of the United States by the executive." This distinction is
expressly incorporated in section 2 of The Trading with the Enemy
Act.7
Whether the 3 d paragraph of subsectionb of section 7 of The Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act" is a reaffirmation of the general -rule of com-
4Speidel v. Barstow Co., 243 Fed. 621 (1917); Hungarian General Credit Bank
v. Titus, 182 App. Div. (N. Y.) 826 (i918); Panne v. Soler, x67 N. Y. Supp. 9oi
(1917); Belly. Chapman, io Johns. (N. Y.) 182 (1813); Crawfordv. The William
Penn, i Pet. C. C. (Eng.) xo6 (I8I5); Mumford v. Mumford, i Gall. (U. S.) 366
(1812); Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 532 (1867); Caperton v. Bowyer, 14
Wall, (U. S.) 216 (1871); Levyv. Stewart, ii Wall (U. S.) 244 (1870).5Speidel v. Barstow, supra, note 4; Tortoriello v. Seghorn, 103 At1. (N. J.) 393
(1918); Clarke v. Morey, io Johns. (N. Y.) 70 (1813); Krachanake v. AcmeMfg. Co., 9 S. E. (N. C.) 83i (1918); State ex rel. Constanti v. Darwin, 173 Pac.(Wash.) 29 (1918). A recent case which shows that this principle is still being
misapplied is Ozbolt v. Lumberman's Exchange, 204 S. W. (Tex.) 252 (1918). It
appeared that the plaintiff resided in Hungary. The Court said: "The merefact that the plaintiffs reside within the borders of a hostile government does not
show that they are alien enemies. * * * The term residence is not synonom-
ous with citizenship."
6Clarke v. Morey, supra, note 5.
74o U. S. State. at Large 411, which reads as follows: "That the word 'enemy'
as used herein shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of such trading and of
this aqt- 'J.(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals of any
nationality resident within the territory (including that occupied by the mili-
tary and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war,
or resident outside the United States and doing business within such territory
and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with
which the United States is at war or incorporated within any country other
than the United States and doing business within such territory."
8
"Nothing in this act shall he deemed to authorize the prosecution of any suit
or action at law or in equity in any court within the United States by an enemy or
ally of enemy prior to the end of the war except as provided in section ten hereof
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mon law is a moot question. The courts have generally ignored it,
and as the signing of a peace treaty is now imminent, such a question
must now be regarded as practically academic. However, in any
future struggles, we would, before Congress took any action defining
our relation with the enemy, be once more dependent upon the prin-
ciples of common law, and legislation would probably follow the
common law. Upon this view, a determination of what the attitude
of our courts would be upon a problem of the kind presented in the
principal case is important.
The rule is founded in public policy and seems to have its origin in
two considerations: Firstly, that the subject of a country at war
with us is in this country, unless he be here with the express or implied
permission of the executive, ex lege, and that he cannot come into the
courts of our country to sue any more than could an outlaw come into
the courts of England to sue: and secondly, that the courts of this
country will give no assistance to proceedings which, if successful,
would be to the advantage of the enemy state by increasing its capa-
city for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money, goods, or
other resources available to individuals in the enemy state. The
answer to our problem must turn on a broad issue of principle. Is the
rule which prevents an enemy alien from suing in our courts a fixed
rule of law, or merely the expression of a public policy which does not
apply to a particular instance if that instance discloses no mischief
from the point of view of public policy? The following language is a
persuasive argument for the latter proposition:9 "A series of deci-
sions based upon grounds of public policy, however eminent the judges
by whom they were delivered, can not possess the same binding
authority as decisions which deal with and formulate principles which
are purely legal. * * * In England, at least, it is beyond the
jurisdiction of her tribunals to mould stereotype national policy.
Their function is * * * not necessarily to accept what was held
to have been the rule of policy a hundred and fifty years ago, but to
ascertain, with as near an approach to accuracy as circumstances per-
mit, what is the rule of public policy for the then present time."
Does public policy demand that we deny access to our courts to a
partnership, most of the members of which are legal citizens, but one
of whom is a non-resident alien enemy? We think not. It must be
remembered that, when a debt due to the firm is collected, no partner
has any definite share of interest in that debt; his right is merely to
have the money so received applied, together with the other assets,
in discharging the liabilities of the firm and to receive his share of any
surplus there may be when liquidation has been completed. Under
these conditions, it i entirely possible that, when the debts of the
partnership are paid, there will be no surplus remaining to be divided
among the partners. But should the existence of a surplus make a
difference in the result? Again the answer must be no. If the con-
tention is made that to permit alien enemies resident abroad to sue in
our courts, would be to lend aid and comfort to the enemy, the answer
is that either the court or the government, through the alien enemy
9Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., (1894) A. C.
(Eng.) 535,553.
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custodian, may so act as to prevent any property coming into the
possession of the enemy.10 There are, on the other hand, strong argu-
ments in favor of permitting the partnership to sue. To debar loyal
citizens from enforcing their just claims is very apt to work serious
hardships. Business life in war times takes on a shifting character
and the close of a long and costly war may find the partnership unable
to enforce claims which might easily have been collected at the out-
break of the war. The possibilities are so obvious as to require no
further elaboration. The keystone of the alien enemy rule must be
taken to be the fear that the enemy will, by means of a successful
prosecution of suit, be supplied with sinews of war. Remove this
keystone and it almost seems as if the whole structure must come
toppling over. The method of procedure above suggested does more
than this. It is a matter of common knowledge that the alien enemy
custodian invested all the income accruing from enemy property
within his custody in government bonds. Surely this is a far more
equitable and desirable result than the one reached by summarily
denying a partnership access to the machinery of the law merely
because one of the members is a non-resident enemy alien. The argu-
ment gathers additional strength when it is remembered that resident
alien enemies were accorded unrestricted access to the courts.
It is rather unfortunate that we have so little case law bearing
directly upon the proposition here involved. In Speidel v. Barstow"
two of the plaintiffs were non-resident alien enemies and two of the
plaintiffs were resident alien enemies. The court held that the cause
of action was indivisible and that as two of the partners were non-
resident alien enemies, the action must be stayed during the con-
tinuance of the war. In opposition to this, we have the case of Pos-
selt v. Despard"2 which it is submitted is the correct rule on principle
and should be universally adopted throughout the country. In that
case one of the plaintiffs was a resident alien enemy and the other
plaintiff a corporation which was a subject of, and resident in Ger-
many. In that case the court adopted the test of public policy above
suggested and arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff must be allowed
to proceed. These are the only American cases which may be said to
directly involve the proposition herein discussed. But a few more
cases should be cited to show that our courts are having some diffi-
culty in digesting in entirety the principle that a non-resident alien
enemy may never be a plaintiff. Thus we have several cases3 in
which, pending the decision on appeal, the original plaintiff became a
non-resident alien enemy. The courts permitted the judgment to be
affirmed despite the rule that a state of war suspends an action during
the continuance of the war.' 4 We have another type of cases of which
Hoskins & Hughes v. Gentry5 is illustrative. The non-resident enemy
'
0Posselt v. D'espard, ioo Atl. (N. J.) 893 (1917).
"Spidelv. Barstow, supra, note 4. nPosselt v. D'espard, supra, note Io.13Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 248 Fed. 636 (i918).
'
4Speidelv. Barstow Co., supra, note 4; Plettenberg, Hoithaus & Co. v. Kalmon
& Co., 241 Fed. 605 (197); Vorhaus v. City National Securities Co., 167 N. 
Y.
Supp. 736 (1917); Taylor v. Albion Co., 168 Pac. (Cal.) 348 (1917); Clennmitt 
v.
Insurance Co., 76 Va. 355 (1882).1563 Ky. 285 (1865). See also Stumpf v. Brewing Co., 242 Fed. 8o (1917).
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plaintiff was a merely nominal party who could not control the suit or
collect the judgment. It was said that this could afford no ground for
dismissing the suit. In still another group of cases, 6 the court calls
attention to the fact that the alien enemy custodian will prosecute the
suit if his attention is called to it. It is submitted that the court in
these cases might have accomplished the same result by decreeing
that the proceeds of the judgment be paid over to the alien enemy
custodian. These cases show the growing inclination to break away
from the rigorous rule of common law which is becoming irksome.
While it is conceded that the preponderance of authority down to
this date has tended to the treatment of the rule as a rule of ordinary
law, and not as a mere expression of a public policy, the courts have
been by no means unanimous. It is therefore respectfully submitted
that as a matter of principle which is supported by eminent authority
on both sides of the ocean, the time is now ripe to entirely break away
from the rule, or at least to confine its application to the situation
where a single non-resident alien enemy is suing. It is further sub-
mitted that, under Anglo-Saxon conceptions, the law is not a merely
mechanical instrument, but a means of working out exact justice,
taking all the circumstances involved into consideration. In this
view, the rule that a non-resident alien enemy cannot sue should
always be tempered by the rule of reason. If the facts of a particular
case warrant the joinder of a non-resident alien enemy plaintiff and
no harm can result to the sovereign from so doing, it is urged that
there is no reason for prohibiting such a course of procedure.
A. L. Sherry, '19.
Constitutional Law: Amendments to the Federal Constitution:
Adoption by referendum.-It has been the contention of opponents
of the National Prohibition Amendment that a referendum on the
adoption of the amendment would be necessary if demanded by the
inhabitants of the states whose constitutions contain provision for
such procedure. This claim is disposed of by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in the case of Herbring v. Brown, decided April 29, I9i9.
Herbring brought a proceeding in mandamus, to compel Brown, the
Attorney-General of Oregon, to prepare a ballot title for a referendum
of the legislative joint resolution ratifying the amendment. The
court decided that mandamus would not issue, on the ground that the
Oregon Constitution does not make legislative resolutions the subject
of referendum.
The distinction between "resolutions" and "acts" or "ordinances"
is generally recognized,3 although the exact question here decided
seems not to have arisen on many previous occasions. Hopping v.
Council of City of Richmoni 4 is cited in accord. In State ex rel. Berry
'
6Nord-Deutsche Insurance Co. v. Dudley Co., 169 N. Y. Supp. 303 (1918);
Rothparth v. Herzfeld, 179 App. Div. (N. Y.) 865 (1917).
'Not yet reported.
2"The people * * * reserve power at their own option to approve or reject
at the polls any act of the legislative assembly." Art. IV, Sec. i, Oregon State
Constitution.3C. & N. P. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 174 Ill. 439 (1898); State v. Delesdenier,
7 Tex. 76 (1851).
417o Cal. 605 (1915).
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v. Superior Court' it was held that the constitutional provision for an
initiative on bills and laws gave no right to insert into a proposed
statute a long preamble consisting largely of argument in favor of the
measure. A legislative resolution, which is ordinarily only an expres-
sion of legislative opinion, would not in most cases be oppressive to
the people; but an attempt to pass a legislative measure in the form
of a resolution might make the resolution subject to a referendum,
especially where a local matter is treated.6
The court in the principal case does not pass upon the propriety of
a referendum under the Federal Constitution, but it seems that this
would be doubtful. The Constitution provides two alternative
methods for ratification of amendments: by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths of the states.7
It seems quite clear that the naming of these methods excludes all
others. The older writers praised the method of amendment as mak-
ing changes comparatively easy, yet guarding against hasty and ill-
considered alterations.8 But since the'adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment, there has been some evidence of a feeling that the ratifi-
cation of amendments by state legislatures does not always correctly
express the wishes of the people, and a change in the method of ratifi-
cation has been advocated by some writers.9 Precedent for amend-
ment by popular vote is found in the Australian Constitution. 10 It
is not inconceivable that the feeling that the legislatures have not, in
the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, followed the will of
those whom they represent, may result in an attempt to change the
old method of ratification."
Richard H. Brown, '19.
Constitutional Law: Taxing power: Federal police regulations.-
The validity of the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act' was attacked in
United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919). This statute requires
persons handling certain narcotic drugs to register with the Collector
of Internal Revenue and pay an annual tax for a license. The sale of
the drugs is also stringently regulated. It is, of course, a fact, that
the statute was enacted to regulate the sale of drugs to "drug addicts"
and with a view to the suppression of the drug habit. The defendant
592 Wash. 6 (1916).
'Hopping v. City of Richmond, supra, note 4.7
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legis-
latures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the
several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress;" Constitution of the
United States, Art. V.
'Story on the Constitution, sees. 1826-1831.
922 Law Notes 221.
'oSec. 128.
"It is reported through the newspapers that the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton has held that a referendum may be had on the Prohibition Amendment.
The Washington Constitution, Art. II, Sec. i (b) provides that a referendum
may be ordered on any act, bill, law or any part thereof."
138 Stat. at Large 785.
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claimed that the act was an attempt to exert the police power reserved
to the states, rather than a revenue measure, and was therefore void.
The District Court had adopted this view.2  The Supreme Court,
over-ruling the District Court's decision, held the statute constitu-
tional, saying that the regulatory provisions of the law could not be
said to have no reasonable relation to the collection of the revenue, and
that this could be the only objection to the validity of the statute.
The principal case is of especial interest at the present time, because
of its bearing upon the question which is certain to go to the Supreme
Court as to the constitutionality of the tax on the employment of child
labor, inserted in the War Revenue Bill.3  The object of the remainder
of this note will be an endeavor to set forth the view taken by the
United States Supreme Court of the validity of statutes which are
ostensibly revenue measures, but which actually have some other
moral or economic purpose.
The only constitutional limitations upon excise taxes are that they
shall be levied for a public purpose and that they shall be geographi-
cally uniform.4 It is well-settled that Congress may levy taxes in aid
of the exercise of other powers conferred upon it by the Constitution;
this is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the case of Veazie Bank v.
Fenno,5 which upheld a prohibitive tax upon the circulation of state
bank notes, designed to drive the notes from circulation. The tax
was upheld on the ground that it was a reasonable means of providing
a national currency.
In general, the courts will not inquire into the motive or purpose
which an excise statute may have, in addition to the raising of
revenue.
8
It is, however, recognized that there may be revenue acts which
would have to be held unconstitutional, even though they violated no
express constitutional provision, on the ground that they would be
destructive of "fundamental rights which no free government could
consistently violate."7  Moreover, regulations may be introduced
which have no reasonable relation to the collection of the revenue, and
which violate some constitutional provision. Such regulations are
ineffective. Thus, in United States v. Dewitt,8 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a clause in a revenue measure, forbidding the sale of
mixed naphtha and illuminating oils, no tax being imposed upon these
oils; the provision was said to be of too remote and uncertain relation
to the collection of reventie to be upheld. The courts will, however,
go to considerable lengths in upholding regulations which may be
connected with revenue measures. This is well illustrated by the
principal case. One clause of the Harrison law prohibits the sale of
the drugs by physicians to anyone save in the course of their profes-
sion, even after the payment of the fee, and it was argued that this
provision, at least, could have no relation to the collection of revenue.
2United States v. Doremus, 246 Fed. 958 (1918).3Act of Feb. 24, 1919, Title XII.4Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
58 Wall. (U. S.) 533 (1869).
6McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).7McCray v. United States, supra, note 6, at p. 63.89 Wall. (U. S.) 41 (1869).
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Four members of the court adopted this view, but the majority
decided that the clause was valid, as it would tend to prevent the
dealing in drugs by anyone who might obtain them from physicians,
and later dispense them to drug addicts without paying a license fee.
In view of the authority of the principal case, there would seem to
be no reason why the Child Labor Tax should not be upheld, if treated
wholly as a tax law.9 If so, Congress will have accomplished through
its taxing power, what the Supreme Court (divided five to 'four)
declared that it could not do under its power to regulate interstate
commerce. It must be admitted that an extension of the exercise of
the taxing power in this direction is resulting in the building up of a
system of federal police regulations at the expense of the police power
of the states. 0
Richard H. Brown, '19.
Criminal Law: Receiving stolen goods.-If X by means of
fraudulent representations induces A to lend him money, credit for
which is transmitted through ordinary banking channels for deposit in
X's account, and X cashs his check against his account and gives the
money to Y, Y knowing of the theft, is Y a receiver of stolen goods?
This is the question in the case of People v. Hanley, 185 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 667 (1i), and the majority of the court answer in the
negative.
It is a fundamental proposition that to sustain an indictment for
receiving stolen goods, the goods received must be the goods stolen.
In the case of Rex v. Walkley,' the thief had exchanged the stolen notes
of /§Ioo each, for notes of a smaller denomination, and had given
these to the accused. The court held that he was not guilty, saying
that if the prisoner never received into his possession either of the
;ioo notes, i. e., the notes actually stolen, he must be acquitted. In
United States v. Montgomery,2 the possession of gold coin for which
stolen gold dust had been exchanged at the mint, was held not to be
the possession of stolen property, although it was conceded by way of
argument that if the dust had been made into coin the change of form
would not have changed its identity, and the possession of such coin
would be the possession of stolen property. In line with this dictum
is the decision in Commonwealth v. White.' In that case after the
larceny and before the accused received the stolen bonds, they were
fraudulently altered by erasures and additions. This change in the
character of the stolen property was held to be no defense to the
charge of receiving stolen goods.
It seems, then, that change of character is immaterial, so long as
the property remains in substance the same property which was
stolen; but if the stolen property is exchanged for other property, the
90n this question, see "Constitutional Aspects of the Child Labor Profits Tax,"
by A. M. Hamburg, 4 National Tax Association Bulletin 167.
'1It is reported through the newspapers that the Child Labor Profits Tax was
declared unconstitutional by District Judge Boyd.
14 Carr. & Payne (Eng.) 132 (1i829).
23 Sawyer (U. S.) 544 (1875).
3123 Mass. 43o (1877).
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crime of receiving stolen goods does not attach to the receipt of the
proceeds of the theft.
It is interesting to consider just what it was in the principal case
that X stole. It was not actually any specific money, for A did not
part with money in specie. He gave his certified check to a Philadel-
phia bank, which wired a credit to its New York correspondent, which
in turn credited X's bank with the amount, and that bank credited
X's personal account opened expressly for the purpose of receiving
such credits. What, then, did X steal? The transmitting banks
acted as the agents of A and it was not until the consummation of the
bookkeeping transaction of credit and debit between the last trans-
mitting bank and X's bank that control of the credit passed from A.
At that point the relation of debtor and creditor arose between X's
bank and X, and at that time the larceny of a sum of money evidenced
by a credit was complete. To hold otherwise would be an excess of
refinement. The case of People v. Moran4 holds it to be unnecessary
in order to complete the crime of larceny by false pretenses that the
thief himself obtain the property; it is sufficient if through his false
and fraudulent representations it be obtained by another on his
account. This is exactly what happened in the principal case.
Shearn, J., in his dissenting opinion in the principal case argues that
although when the money was in the bank legal title to it was of course
in the bank, yet when it was paid over the counter to X it was not X's
money, but A's, and the appropriation of it by X was larceny; that
therefore the very money which was stolen was the money afterward
turned over to Y. He cites as analogous the case of People v. Lam-
merts,5 which, however, seems rather atthority for the conclusion
reached above that the larceny was complete when the money was
deposited in X's bank. The defendant in that case was a county
treasurer. The money on deposit for the county belonged to the bank
as debtor of the county. Defendant, in his capacity of treasurer,
made out a check on that account for which he procured a bank draft
to the order of B, and gave the draft to B in payment of a personal
debt. The defense contended that it was the draft which was mis-
appropriated and that there was no larceny. It was held, however,
that there was a larceny of the money which the draft represented.
To reach this result the court resorted to a fiction, viz., that when
defendant fraudulently procured the draft to be made out and appro-
priated it to his own use, the effect was the same as if he had received
the money for the treasurer's check and had then appropriated the
money to his own use and with it purchased the draft. The case does
not support the position that X committed larceny when he received
the money from his bank. Whatever fraud X committed was in the
procuring of the deposit credit. There was no fraud in his obtaining
the money from the bank, for the bank was his individual debtor as
to that.
It is submitted that the crime of larceny was consummated when
the credit was entered to X's account in the books of the bank, and
443 App. Div. (N. Y.) 155 (1899); affirmed without opinion ,161 N. Y. 657(1900).
516 4 N.Y. 137 (1900).
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that the money received by Y was not the stolen property, but the
avails thereof, and that Y therefore is not guilty of the crime of
receiving stolen goods.
Mary H. Donlon, '20.
Domestic Relations: Annulment of marriage.-Section 1744 of
the New York Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "An action to
annul a marriage heretofore or hereafter contracted, on the ground
that one of the parties had not attained the age of legal consent, or the
age under which the consent of parents or guardians was required by the
laws of the state where the marriage was contracted, may be maintained
by the infant, or by either parent of the infant, or by the guardian of
the infant's person." The words italicized, were added by the Laws
of i916. The first reported application' of this section, as amended in
1916, seems to be in Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc. (N. Y.) 492 (1918). The
plaintiff was twenty years of age, and engaged in independent employ-
ment. The defendant was thirty years old. On August 29th, 1916,
the parties left their home in Cortland, N. Y., early in the morning and
went to Pennsylvania. In that state it is provided by statute2 that,
"No person within this Commonwealth shall be joined in marriage,
until a license shall have been obtained for that purpose," etc., and
"If any of the persons intending to marry by virtue of such license
shall be under 21 years of age, the consent of their parents or guardians
shall be personally given before such clerk," otherwise such license
will not issue. The plaintiff in answer to the questions in the license
blank as to his age, stated that he was twenty-one and took the oath
that the facts set forth in his application were true. Before plaintiff
made the application he told defendant that he had the written con-
sent of his father to the marriage and showed her some paper purport-
ing to be the signed consent of his father, but stated that as he was
nearer twenty-one than twenty, he would not show the paper to the
clerk. Having thus obtained the license the parties were married in
Pennsylvania and returned home on the same day to Cortland, N. Y.,
where they continued, for six months, to reside as husband and wife.
Plaintiff, becoming dissatisfied, separated from his wife and now
brings this suit for annulment on the ground that he had not at the
time of the marriage attained the age of twenty-one under which the
consent of the parents or guardians was required in the state of
Pennsylvania.
The facts thus stated bring the case within the letter of section 1744
as amended in 1916, and the question is-is the statute mandatory,
conferring on the plaintiff the relief sought as a matter of strict legal
right, or may a court in the exercise of its equitable powers, inquire
into the circumstances and deny judgment where the party does not
'In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 97 Misc. (N. Y.) 153 (1916), this same point was
not involved. Though plaintiff based his right of recovery on section 1744 of the
New York Code of Civ. Proc., as amended in 1916, the marriage had been con-
tracted in this state and the court held that this amendment applied only to mar-
riages celebrated in foreign states where the age of legal consent had not been pro-
vided for, and not to marriages celebrated in this state where the age of consent
-was 18 as before the amendment.
'Laws of 1895 (No. 123) as amended by Laws of 19o3 (No. 175).
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come into court with clean hands. Davis, J., in deciding this case,
does not regard the statute as mandatory and denies the relief sought.
The American cases have generally recognized the rule that the
validity of a marriage, both in respect to the form and mode of its
celebration, and in respect to the capacity of the parties thereto,
depends upon the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, 3
rather than upon the law of the domicile. However, some of the
cases while recognizing this general rule, have made an exception
thereto if the marriage, though valid where celebrated, is contrary to
the distinctive public policy of the domicile of the parties. 4
A few cases5 have departed from this general rule, that the validity
of a marriage depends upon the law of the place where the marriage
is celebrated, the reason being given, that marriage is something more
than a mere contract, and that it establishes a status which is the
subject of the law of the domicile. Those cases, however, ignore the
fundamental distinction between the contract and the status. The
initial validity of a contract is one thing, and the right to dissolve it
for causes arising after it has been established is quite another. Thus
a divorce which assumes the previous existence of a marriage status
and declares that it shall henceforth be dissolved, depends upon the
law of the domicile.6 If this decree be rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the status, the result is to put an end to the status
for the future without affecting its existence in the past. In decreeing
an annulment on the other hand, the court decides whether or not
such a status was ever created, and the proper judge for determining
this question would seem to be the state which created it. Although
every state can regulate the status of its own citizens, yet in the
absence of express words, we cannot infer a legislative intent to contra-
vene the jus gentium under which the validity of a marriage contract
is referred to the lex loci contractus. Such an intent cannot be attri-
buted to the legislature unless it is clearly and unmistakably expressed
in the statute,7 and this is true even where the parties domiciled in this
state visit another jurisdiction for the sole purpose of contracting
a marriage forbidden by our statutes.s Werner, J., in his dissenting
opinion in Cunningham v. Cunningham,9 says that annulment cannot
be granted in such cases except by judicial legislation. In fact the
cases following the general rule almost all admit, that if expressly pro-
vided for by legislation, a court may have the power to invalidate
a marriage contracted in another state.' So whatever may be the
3Reidv. Reid, 73, Misc. (N.Y.) 214 (igii); Donohue v. Donohue, 63 Misc. 'i
(i9o9); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. x8 (1881); Thorp v. Thorp, 9o N. Y.
602 (1882); Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521 (1883); Campbell v. Crampton,
2 Fed. 417 (i88o).443 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2o6 N. Y. 341 (1912),
would not recognize the validity of a marriage celebrated in New Jersey, because
"repugnant to our public policy and legislation."5Mitchell v. Mitchell, 63 Misc. (N.Y.) 580 (1909); Ydnnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y.
535 (1871).
62 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, see. 13o.
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, note 3.
$Thorp v. Thorp, supra, note 3; Moore v. Hegeman, supra, note 3.9Supra, note 4.
'
0Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, note 3.
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better view on the question of jurisdiction for the annulment of mar-
riage, the present amendment has overcome that difficulty in such a
case as the one before us.
The words of this statute, however, are not mandatory. It does
not in so many words say that the decree shall be given under certain
conditions, but that: "An action to annul * * * may be main-
tained * * *." The principle is well recognized that unless a
statute expressly prohibits or prescribes something, it will not be con-
strued as mandatory and the court will not be compelled as matter of
right to grant the relief asked for." The question as to whether courts
sitting in matrimonial cases, may apply equitable principles in giving
relief, is not entirely settled in this state, although the tendency is to
follow the rules and maxims of equity in administering the law. It
seems that while the entire jurisdiction in matrimonial cases is con-
ferred and regulated by statute, yet the court in the exercise of that
jurisdiction, unless controlled by positive enactment, proceeds as a
court of equity. 2 In various cases it has been held that where a
marriage is not void but voidable, a court will deny a plaintiff relief
where he fails to come into court with clean hands.'3 That was the
decision of the Appellate Division in Stokes v. Stokes, 14 and though
later reversed in the Court of Appeals 5 on other grounds, that court
still admits that there might well be extreme cases where the position
of the parties is so inequitable that a court of equity will refuse to
interfere.
Davis, J., considers that the circumstances in Bays v. Bays present
such an extreme case. Plaintiff was twenty years of age and defend-
ant ten years his senior. In one day, they had left their home in New
York, had gone to Pennsylvania where they were married and
returned to their New York home. In order to obtain a marriage
license in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff had made a false affidavit as to
his age. 'It is evident from such a case as this, that the intent of the
legislature was not to make this provision mandatory and encourage
an evasion of the statutory regulations concerning marriage, but
rather to give a remedy in this state for parties who had become resi-
dents of this state, but who were residents of another state at the time
of their marriage. To grant relief in every case coming under this
section without regard to equitable principles, "would be to hold that
by the exercise of discretion in the selection of the place to have the
ceremony performed, it is not only possible but very easy under our
laws for those legally entitled to marry, to enter into a 'trial marriage'
or to establish a relation of legalized concubinage for an indefinite
period. The authority and sanction of the courts should not be given
to a doctrine so abhorrent to the well-recognized sanctity of the mar-
riage status." 6  Dorothea Koch, '20.
"Berry v. Berry, 13o App. Div. (N. Y.) 53 (1909).
-2Berry v. Berry, supra, note ii.
13Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. (N. Y.) 218 (1893); McCarron v. McCarron, 26 Misc.
(N. Y.) 158 (1899); Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 231 (19O1); Hall v.
Hall, 139 App. Div. (N. Y.) 120 (191o).
14128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 838 (19o8).
11198 N. Y. 301 (1910).
'
6Bays v. Bays, lO5 Misc. (N. Y.) 492, 500 (1918).
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Domestic Relations: Adoption.-The case of Ball v. Brooks, 173
N. Y. Supp. 746 (1918), was an action by plaintiff as executrix of the
estate of John Ball against the executors of the estate of one Mrs.
Le Gacy to establish a contract of adoption which involved a promise
to leave property to plaintiff's testator on Mrs. Le Gacy's death. The
plaintiff asks that the alleged contract between Ball and Mrs. Le Gacy
be specifically performed and that the property of the defendant's
testator be transferred to her as executrix of Ball's estate. The con-
tract was made prior to 1873 in which year the first general adoption
act was passed by the New York Legislature. The court held the
contract could not be enforced because adoption was invalid in the
absence of legislative authorization.
Adoption was practiced by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians,
Athenians, Spartans and Hebrews.' By the Roman law according to
the Institutes of Justinian only males could adopt and the adopter had
to be older by eighteen years than the person adopted.2 There were
two kinds of adoption practiced by the Romans. The first was
adrogation. By this was meant that Roman citizens, who were free
and independent cotd be acopted by a speoial enaptment of the
comitia'euiiata in eaoh instance. Adrogation could also be effected by
will. The effect of adrogation was that the person adrogated lost his
independence and became subject to his foster parent. The property
of the child passed to the adrogator. The second method of adoption
was called adoptio. By adoption was meant the passing of a person
who wafs not independent from one family to another.3 Before
Justinian's time this manner of adoption was accomplished by the
father fictitiously selling his son three times, but under the later
imperial judicial system this clumsy method was abolished and all that
was required was merely a declaration before a magistrate, both the
foster parent and the adopted person being present. Under the earlier
law the effect of adoption was that the adopted person passed under
the power of the adoptingparent, but accordingto Justinian adoption
conferred no paternal power at all of itself. Justinian gave the
adopted child the right to inherit from his natural patents as well as
from his f6ster parents, whereas, before, the right to inherit did not
extend to the 3iatural parents.4
Adoption was practised in a somewhat different way among the
primitive Germans and in the Frankish period. The adoption of a
son was allowed only to parents without an h6ir already, or to others
with the consent of all their issue. It was effected by handing over
the child to the foster parent who then gave him arms or did some
other act or acts to show that he recognized him as his son. The
child thereupon be~ame a member of the household of the adopting
father. By the modem law of Germany a relation is established
which is like that existing between natural parents and children but
'Hockady v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456 (19o6).
2Institutes, I, 1', 4 Moyle.
3Two things were required to constitute a legal adoption: "First, the paternal
power of the natural father had to be extinguished; second, the paternal power
'of the adoptive father had to be constituted." 2 Sherman, Roman Law in the
Modem World, 83-91..
42 Sherman, Roman Law in the Modem World, p. 83-91.
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without producing all the legal consequences of the natural relation
or breaking all the ties of the adopted child with its natural family.
Before the German Civil Code was enacted, the natural father had
charge of the administration and profits of the property of a minor
adopted child. But sec. 1757 of the Code provides, "By the adoption
of a child, the child acquires the legal status of a legitimate child of
the adopter." Sec. 1757 has withdrawn from the adopting parents
all rights of inheritance in the property of the adopted child;5 but the
child is left the right in accord with the earlier law, to inherit both
from its blood kindred and from its adopting parents but not from thelatter's kindred.6 I The Swiss Code, secs. 264-269, has substantially
the same provisions as the German Code as to inheritance. The
adopter must be at least forty years old and without legitimate issue.
The adopting parent must be at least eighteen years older than the
child adopted.
Adoption was early practised in France. It, however, fell into dis-
use at an early pehod. But under the Revolution, it was revived and
ent~red into the law. The requirements of adoption were limited to
the drawing up of an authenticated deed. By this means alone, with-
out any exact conditions, the person adopted acquired the rights of a
natural son. Adoption was irrevocable by the foster parent but
could be renounced by the child. 8 The French Civil Code, sections
348, 350, allows the child to inherit from both the natural and foster
parents.
Adoption in some form also exists in Austria, Italy, Spain and Japan
by their codes.9
Thus adoption was a part of the civil law but was never known to
the common law of England. In England adoption in the sense of the
transfer of parental rights and duties in respect of a child or another
person and their assumption by him was never recognized by the law.10
The common law has not been changed by statute in England." Fol-lowing the English common law there is no adoption recognized by the
common law in the United States.12
In the middle of the nineteenth century the states began to pass
general statutes permitting adoption. Massachusetts was the first
state to pass such an act'in 185i. Its object was to change the suc-
cession of property and to create relations of paternity and affiliation
not existing before.' 3 Massachusetts has been followed by the other
states until we have some sort of adoption recognized in every state
in the union.
5It reads, "The adoption of a child is no foundation of a right of inheritance for
the adopter."6Sec. 1764 of the Civil Code provides, "The rights and duties arising out of the
relation between the child and its relatives are not affected by the adoption of the
child, in so far as the law does not otherwise provide."
74 Continental Legal History Series 66o-66i.
83 Continental Legal History Series 217-219.
92 Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World, p. 83-91.
'
0Humphreys v. Polak, [1901] 2 X. B. (Eng.) 385, 390.
n1 7 Halsbury, Laws of England in.12In re Thorne, 155 N. Y. 140 (1898); Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 393 (1887);Morrison v. Estate of Sessions, 70 Mich. 297 (i888); Carroll v. Collins, 6 App.
Div. (N. Y.) io6 (1896); Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358 (1879).
"Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (188o).
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The first general adoption act in New York was passed in 1873.'4
The act provided that" a child when adopted should take the name of
the person adopting, and the two henceforth should sustain toward
each other the legal relation of parent and child and have all the
rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation excepting the
right of inheritance and except as to the limitations over of real and
personal property under deeds, wills, devises and trusts * * *."
This act was amended by the laws of 1887 and gave the right of
inheritance to children legally adopted. 5 These acts were mcor-
pprated in the original domestic relations law enacted in 1896 which
became with some modifications a part of the Consolidated Laws of
1909, and at present constitute sections tio-ii8 of the Domestic
Relations Law.16 An unusual provision was added in 1915 whereby
the adoption of adults was permitted. 7
Before the act of 1873, however, there were in force various special
statutes in New York which authorized particular charitable institu-
tions in this state to place children committed to their care with per-
sons who consented to take them by adoption, and in such a case a
formal instrument was executed to express and carry out the intent of
the parties.' By these acts no right of inheritance was given unless
expressly so stated in the statute. However, the infant was for all
intents and purposes in the same situation as a nattural child of the
parents, except for legal rightsas heiror next of kin, by being received
in the family and treated as a child by the family.' 9
As these special statutes became frequent, the legislature by the act
of 1873 legalized all these adoptions and prescribed a uniform method
of adoption for the future.20 The act of 1873 expressly provides that
"nothing herein contained shall prevent proof of the adoption of any
child heretofore made according to any method practised in this state
from being received in evidence nor such adoption from having the
effect of an adoption hereunder." This saving clause has no applica-
tion to adoptions which were not authorized by these special statutes.
2 1
The alleged adoption in the principal case took place before 1873,
14Laws of 1873, Ch. 880.15Laws of 1887, Ch. 703.
icCh. i9.
17Sec. Iio Domestic Relations Law. This section was amended by the Laws of
1917, Ch. 149, limiting the right of inheritance of an adult adopted in accordance
with the act as it stood in 1915 so as not to apply to alter estates or trusts or
devises in wills made or created before Apr. 22, 1915.
'sFor example, such a statute was passed in 1849, Laws of 1849, Ch. 244, incor-
porating the American Female Guardian Society.
"
9Carroll v. Collins, supra, note 12. Simmons v. Burrell, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 388.
(1894).
21Simmons v. Burrell, supra, note 19.
"'Carroll v. Collins, supra, note 12.
A concrete example of how these statutes affected adoption may be illustrated
as follows: suppose a child was adopted in i86o according to a special statute
then in force. By this adoption the status of the child was for all purposes the
same as if a natural child but without the right of inheritance. Simmons v.
Burrell, supra, note i9. The act of 1873 legalized this adoption, and the effect
of the saving clause was that this adoption was of the same legal effect as if the
methods there laid down had been fully complied with. By the act of 1887, the
right of inheritance was given to adopted children, so the child adopted by the
special act of i86o had the right to inherit. Simmons v. Burrell, supra, note ig.
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was not made under the provisions of any special statute in force at
that time and so was not legalized by the act of 1873 for it was not
within the scope of the saving clause and, therefore, the act of 1887
allowing inheritance could not be invoked by the plaintiff in this case.
It follows that specific performance was rightly denied.
Charles Warren Little, '20.
Evidence: Criminal prosecution: Proof of other offenses as part
of a scheme.-In Haley v. State, 209 S. W. (Tex.) 675 (i918), a
prosecution for the murder of one Williams, the state proceeded upon
the theory that deceased's death was a part bf the accused's general
plan to rid himself of all obstacles to the continuance of his illicit rela-
tions with the wife of the deceased. Evidence offered in support of
this hypothesis, to the effect that the prisoner's wife was poisoned ten
months previous to the conunission of the murder charged, was
rejected on the ground that it was not proved that the accused had
committed this crime. There had been no indictment nor other pro-
ceedings against the defendant for the murder of his own wife, nor was
such charged in his indictment as a part of a plan to murder Williams.
It is a well recognized rule of criminal procedure that on the trial of
a person accused of a crime proof of a distinct, independent offense is
inadmissible.' This principle is a natural consequence of our indul-
gence of the well established presumption of the prisoner's innocence
until his guilt is proved. To permit the jury to be confused by a
variety of issues, and to be improperly influenced to decide the issue
before them solely upon an unjust assumption of defendant's probable
criminality; and to countenance the damaging of the defendant's
interest incident to the surprise caused, and the departure from the
issue framed by the indictment, would not accord with our system of
justice. A modification of this rule, however, allows the admission of
evidence of motive which suggests the doing of the crime charged, not-
withstanding it tends to prove or does prove another crime.2 This is
especially important where this motive embraces and the evidence of
it discloses a common scheme or plan. The principal case is illustra-
tive of the above practice. To prove that the murder charged was
committed by the defendant, a motive for its commission was shown
in the existence of a general plan whereby the defendant was to con-
tinue unobstructed his illicit intimacy with the deceased's wife. It
was in substantiation of this plan that evidence of the poisoning of his
own wife was offered.
The grounds of the court's refusal to admit the evidence in the
principal case would seem unsustainable in New York.3 The Texas
1State v. Riggs, 39 Conn. 498 (1872); People v. Ascher, 126 Mich. 637 (1901);
Janzen v. People, 159 Ill. 44o (1896); State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245 (1876);
People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427 (1887); People v. Greenwall, io8 N.Y. 296 (1888);People v. McLaughlin, i5O N.Y. 365, 386 (1896); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y.
264 (1901).2Mayer v. People, 8o N. Y. 364 (i88o); Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 4 18 (1881)
People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591 (1887); People v. Williams, 58 Hun (N. Y.)
278 (189o); People v. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450 (1892); Peoplev. Shea, 147 N. Y.
78, 99 (1895); Peoplev. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 (1897).
TPeople v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13, 32 (1887).
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court limited the application of this exceptional principle to the
instance where the evidence offered of another offense clearly proved
it. This doctrine is undoubtedly safer and more careful of the prison-
er's interests than that adopted by the New York courts, which per-
mits the submission of the facts of another wrongdoing to the jury
for whatever value they may contain or be assigned. Although New
York would seem to be out of line with the weight of authority in this
regard,4 its practice cannotbesaidto result dangerously to the accused.
Theoretically, at least, he is adequately protected if the jury is care-
fully instructed to consider facts of this nature only in inferring there-
from a general plan, the object of which would show clearly a motive
to commit the crime charged.
A vast number of decisions announce this rule of evidence with its
equally well established exception, but one may question what the
pleadings must contain in order that the court may permit its applica-
tion. Is it analogous to the evidence rule which denies proof of negli-
gence by offering instances of similar negligent acts, unless the negli-
gence alleged is that of selecting incompetent employees? New York
authority would probably say not.5 It may be mentioned that no
case in this jurisdiction has either affirmed or denied the problem to
be one of pleading. The cases correctly recognize that so long as the
evidence is admissible in proof of motive, which in turn would dis-
close a plan or scheme, including in its scope the act for which the
defendant is indicted, no question of pleading should intervene.6
Motive is the inducement to the commission of a crime, while intent
is the mental state of determination to commit that particular crime.
Motive is a natural element in a crime but it is not indispensable, and,
unlike intent, need not be proved to obtain a conviction. Inasmuch
as it is not a necessary ingredient to be alleged in establishing a cause,
it would seem to follow that the facts proving it need not be alleged.
When motive becomes important, therefore, not as an indispensable
element to secure a conviction, but as a means to the identification of
the accused with the crime, the facts constituting it would obviously
not be required to be alleged. All that is necessary is that they be
proved.7  With the establishment of motive as the object in view,
logic would seem to justify a rule, then, that does not demand in the
indictment the allegation of the prior offense which is sought to be
proved.
In the few cases where the objection to the evidence of other offenses
is based on the injustice of being compelled to meet a fact not made in
the indictment, it has been denied or sustained solely on grounds of
evidence.8 If the attempt is made to give evidence of a crime inde-
pendent and distinct from the principal one, clearly the objection
would be valid, for the evidence would not be relevant. But where
4People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, 518 (1865); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146
Mass. 571, 581 (1888); State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200 (1911); Baxter v. State, 91
Oh. St. 167, 171 (1914); Swan v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 218 (1883).5People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455 (1894).6Cases in note 2, supra.
'People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137 (1872); People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253(1898).
"Cases, notes I and 2, supra.
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there is such a connection between the crimes that they appear to be
part of a plan, it should not be rejected because there is no allegation
that this plan existed and that this crime was part of it. The defend-
ant need not be advised of the facts to be used against him in proof of
the motive which instigated him in the commission of the offense for
which he is charged. It is this preliminary step only which this doc-
trine seeks to accomplish.' This being so, the defendant is not
required to face two crimes, for it is evident he might easily acquit
himself of one act although he was unable to disprove another which
has been offered in evidence to build up a probable motive assignable
to him. Motive may be proved but in no sense does the defendant
stand convicted thereby. For instance, in the principal case the
poisoning of Mrs. Haley by the defendant would tend to show a
motive that would justify the jury in believing that the defendant
committed the crime charged. But he is in no worse position than if
he admitted a statement made by himself that he was amorous of the
deceased's wife, and certainly it cannot be said that this should be
alleged. In either situation the presumption of guilt may be over-
thrown by countless means at the disposal of the defendant, and he
need go no further than the facts immediately connected with the
offense charged. One may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the
question is one of evidence alone; and if the facts properly justify
the admission of the evidence to indicate a general plan, in proof of a
reasonable motive connecting the defendant with the indictment laid,
it is unnecessary to allege the motive or the facts upon which it is
based.
Eugene F. Gilligan, 'ip.
Evidence: Declarations admissible as part of the res gestae.-
People v. De Simone, 121 N. E. (N. Y.) 761 (1919), is the latest expres-
sion from the New York Court of Appeals on the question of admit-
ting declarations as a part of the res gestae. It furnishes an illustra-
tion of the difficulty of formulatng a statement which will avoid
rather than add to the confusion which has grown up around this
doctrine. De Simone was indicted and tried for murder for shooting
Della Rosa on Thompson Street, New York City. The evidence
showed that after the shots, the defendant ran south about 8o feet and
then turnedwest on Houston Street, where he was apprehended by an
officer after running a short distance. The witness, another officer, at
the time he heard the shots was standing on Thompson Street, about
75 feet south from its intersection with Houston Street. His view
north was obscured by a wagon. He immediately ran toward Hous-
ton street, and, when within about ten feet of it, some one in the
crowd that had collected shouted: "He ran over Houston Street."
He then turned on Houston Street and came to the place where the
prisoner had been apprehended. A pistol was found near this place.
The trial court admitted the shout: "He ran over Houston Street"
as a part of the res gest.e. The Court of Appeals held it competent,
not as a part of the res gesth, but as a part of the relevant explanation
and description of the acts of the witness, saying: "The main or
9Commonwealth v. Robinson, supra, note 4, PP. 577-579.
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principal transaction being investigated and adjudged, through and
by virtue of the trial, was the shooting, the circumstances and condi-
tions attendant upon or surrounding it, and was it done by the defend-
ant under those circumstances and conditions? In the investigation
deeds and statements of the participants in the transaction, or of
observers of it, which accompanied, emanated from, and were a part
of it, could be detailed by witnesses who saw or heard them. Deeds
and acts which explain, describe, or characterize the transaction as an
accomplished act are to be distinguished from those which are a part
of it and are forced or brought into utterance or existence by and in
the evolution of the transaction itself, and which stand in immediate
causal relation to it. The former are hearsay and not competent as
evidence; the latter are of the res gestco and are relevant and com-
petent."
The attempted distinction between deeds and declarations of the
participants, or observers, of the princpal transaction being investi-
gated, which accompanied, emanated from and were a part of it, and
which explain, describe or characterize the transaction as an accom-
plished fact, and those which are a part of it, and are forced or brought
into utterance or existence by it, and in the evolution of the transac-
tion itself, and which stand in immediate causal relation to it, is far
from clear.
Because of the different classes of cases to which the shibboleth
res geste is applied, it is admittedly a difficult task to formulate an
accurate statement which will embrace all. As said in a Georgia case:'
"To make the attempt is something like trying to execute a portrait
which shall enable the possessor to recognize every member of a
numerous family." The clearest exposition of the subject in New
York is found in People v. Del Vermo.2 In that case the court enumer-
ates three separate and distinct classes or groups of facts to which the
description "part of the res gestca" has been applied: (x) acts or
declarations themselves issuable facts; (2) acts or declarations admis-
sible as accompanying and elucidating equivocal acts; (3) declara-
tions spontaneously uttered while under the influence of an exciting
event.
Declarations falling within the first class are illustrated by conversa-
tion embodying the terms of a verbal contract,3 words of defamation,
etc. No objection that these declarations are hearsay could be
entertained. While the words said are in a literal sense "things
done," or a part of the things done, their ddmission in evidence
depends upon no exception to the hearsay rule.
Declarations within the second class, sometimes called "verbal
acts,"'4 must possess four characteristics: the utterance must
accompany the conduct to which it is desired to attach some legal
effect;5 the conduct characterized must be independently material to
'Cox v. State,. 64 Ga. 374, 41o (1879).
2People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 47 (1908).3McDougallv. Hess, 68 N. Y. 62 (1877); Potts v. Hart, 99 N.Y. 168 (1885);
Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546 (1882).
'Wigmore on Evidence, see. 1772.
People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874); Fugg v. Child, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 246
(1852).
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the issue;6 it must be equivocal;7 and the words must merely aid in
giving significance to the conduct.8 Declarations made by one in
possession of realty, which tend to characterize that possession as
adverse or otherwise, constitute one illustration within this class. A
witness telling of these declarations would be giving hearsay evidence,
but it would be admitted as one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
of exclusion. Various other illustrations are collected in Wigmore on
Evidence.9
In the third class, illustrated by People v. Del Vermo, supra, the
declarations are hearsay, concern a material fact in the case, and
nearly always come afterwards in point of time. They must, how-
ever, be spontaneous and follow an exciting event so closely as to
preclude opportunity for the will of the speaker to mould or modify
them. 0 The admission of such declarations stand on a different
ground from that which supports the other two classes. It is the
element of spontaneity that is accepted to sufficiently guaranty
their trustworthiness and excuse the absence of an oath and cross-
examination.
Attempts to determine whether a declaration is, or is not spon-
taneous, from mere lapse of time, have not proved satisfactory. It
is evident that the character of the exciting event and many other
surrounding circumstances may vary the time within which the event
will continue to dominate the reasoning faculties. Lapse of time is
only one of the facts to be considered.
In Greener v. General Electric Company," the deceased, who fell from
a ladder, in reply to a question put to him by a fellow employee within
a few seconds after the fall, said: "My feet is broke, the ladder bent
over." In excluding the statement the court suggests that it was
narrative because in response to an inquiry. The opinion cited with
approval People v. Del Vermo, supra. But that a declaration was
made in response to an inquiry cannot be made the sole test of spon-
taneity is evident from an inspection of People v. Del Vermo, where the
murdered man, a few seconds after being stabbed, and in view of the
fleeing murderer, said, in response to an inquiry as to what was the
matter: "Del Vermo stabbed me with a knife." As already pointed
out the same court held this declaration to be spontaneous. The time
element was about the same in both cases. In both the declaration
was in response to an inquiry. And yet some other factor, which is
not made to appear in the opinions, lead to opposite conclusions. The
Greener case unfortunately confuses the very clear exposition in the
Del Vermo case by a reference, with approval, to the earlier case of
Wadele v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.3" Some portions of the opinion in
the Wadele case are misleading, and it may be the court was misled
by them in the Greener case. In the Wadele case it was said:
6Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1773.
7Abeel v. Gelder, 36 N.Y. 513 (1867); Morss v. Salisbury, 48 N.Y. 636 (1872).
sWaterman v. Whitney, ii N. Y. 157 (1854); Winters v. Judd, 12 N. Y. Supp.
4H1 (1891).9Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 1777-1784.
'
0Kennedy v. R. C. & B. R. R. Co., 13o N. Y. 654 (1891).
'Greener v. General Electric Co., 2o9 N. Y. 135 (I9M3).
"Wadele v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 274 (1884).
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"The res gestae, speaking generally, was the accident. These
declarations were no part of that-were not made at the same time,
or so nearly contemporaneous with it as to characterize it, or throw
any light upon it. They are purely narrative, giving an account of a
transaction, not partly past, but wholly past and completed. They
depend for their truth wholly upon the accuracy and reliability of the
deceased, and the veracity of the witness who testified to them.
Nothing was then transpiring or evident to any witness which could
confirm the declarations or by which upon cross examination of the
witness testifying, or by the examination of other witnesses, the truth.
of the declarations could be tested. * * * When the act of a
party may be given in evidence, his declarations made at the time,
and calculated to elucidate and explain the character and quality of
the act, and so connected with it as to constitute one transaction,
and so as to derive credit from the act itself, are admissible in evi-
dence. The credit which the act or fact gives to the accompanying
declarations as a part of the transaction, and the tendency of the
contemporary declarations as a part of the transaction to explain the
particular fact distinguish this class of declarations from mere hear-
say. . . There must be a main or principal fact or transaction; and
only such declarations are admissible as grow out of the principal
transaction, illustrate its character, are coltemporary with it, and
derive some degree of credit from it."
In so far as the above quotation from the Wadele case announces
that there must be a material transaction, and that declarations to be
admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule must grow out of
it, and derive credit from it, the statement is undoubtedly accurate.
The declarations must be the result of the exciting event, and derive
their credit from the excitement which, for the time, controls the
deliberative faculties. But that the declarations must be exactly
contemporary with the transaction is not accurate, as is pointed out
in the Del Vermo case, supra. As is also pointed out by that case, the
declarations need not qualify or explain the act of stabbing, etc. They
may introduce the entirely new element of who did the stabbing, or
as to how the main transaction came about. To say that the declara-
tions must qualify and explain the main act is confusing the principles
upon which spontaneous declarations are admitted, with those appli-
cable to the second class of cases above discussed. In that class the
element of spontaneity is not essential. The act is equivocal, and
needs explanation. Declarations which tend to explain may be given.
When dealing with spontaneous declarations, however, more often
than not the main act is not equivocal. It needs no explanation.
The declaration admitted does not explain or elucidate it, except in
the sense that it is related to it because of its introduction of another
fact in the same series of events.
Again, the exclusion of the statement because it was not capable of
corroboration seems erroneous. The court says that there is no
possible means of testing the truth of the declarations. The reason
for accepting such statements as the one in this case, without requiring
a verification, is that the excitement of the event is presumed to have
forced the witness to utter a truth. It is made involuntarily, either
against his will or without his will, and is consequently the statement
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of a fact as the declarant observes it. The same state of evidence was
present in Greener v. General Electric Co., supra. There, no corrobora-
tion of the truth of the statement could be gotten, and it is possible
that the court in that case took this into consideration when excluding
the statement. It did not expressly state this as a ground of exclusion.
The rule in New York that the spontaneous declaration must be
one made by the injured person is unfortunate. Admission under this
rule is admittedly of hearsay matter. It is allowed because the reflec-
tive faculties are quiescent under the shock of a given event. If that
event is such, then, as will still these reflective faculties, the ejacula-
tion should be receivable in evidence whether it is made by the injured
party or by a bystander. New York seems pledged to the other rule.13
This is contra to the general view.14 It would seem probable that this
result is reached in New York by confusion with the verbal act doc-
trine, in which the requirement, that the statement be one made by
the person doing the equivocal act, is proper. The ejaculation must
have been made by one having personal observation of the event."
It must have been made concerning relevant matter. 6
To the above three divisions of the res gestae rule Wigmore adds two
others. They are, (4) admission where the thing said or done shows
a certain mental condition, and (5) the admissions made by co-con-
spirators and agents.
In cases where mental condition is material, admissions or acts
evidentiary of this condition, are allowable in evidence. 7 Admit-
tance of declarations made just previous to death, by one whom it is
charged committed suicide, to show his mental condition, presents a
good illustration of this rule. There is one modification in New York
to this general rule. Statements of pain are admissible in evidence,
to show the suffering of the one making the statement, only when
made to a medical practitioner.'8 Evidence of involuntary sounds,
such as sighs, groans, etc., are admissible whether made to a lay wit-
ness or to a medical practitioner. 9 Other requirements mistakenly
impressed on this class belong to the other theories.
In these five distinct classes it will be observed that, (i) statements
which are issuable facts are not hearsay, (2) declarations which qualify,
elucidate, or explain the act in question have absolutely no application
to any other of the four classes, and (3) the element of spontaneity is
necessary to only the one class-and where the statement qualifies,
elucidates, or explains the act, it need not be spontaneous to be
allowed admittance.
The court in the principal case allowed the testimony as being
13Popl v.DelVerosupra, note 2; Fleska v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 152 N.
'
4WigMore on Evidence, sec. 1755.
"Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1751.
'
6Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1754.
'"Swift v. Mass. Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 186 (1875); Terwilliger v. L. I. R. R. Co.,
152 App. Div. (N. Y.) 168 (1912); Goldschnidt v. Life Ins. Co., i i N. Y. Supp.
233 (1909).18Rochev. B. C. & M. R. R. Co., lO5 N. Y. 294 (1887); Davidson v. Cornell,
132 N. Y. 228 (1892); Reed v. C. I. & B. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 574 (1871).
'
91-agenlocher v. C. I. & B. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 136 (1885); Roche v. B. C. &
M. R. R. Co., supra, note 18.
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explanatory of the actions of the witness. Was this testimony admis-
sable under the verbal act doctrine? There are two possible things
which would bar it; (i) the immateriality of the conduct which it
characterizes, and (2) the fact that the statement was made by a by-
stander. It would seem that the statement was material. The thing
that the words tend to qualify, or explain, was of importance in the
apprehension of the murderer. The explanation of the witness' reason
for running after the defendant gave significance to this act. But,
though material, the statement should be refused admittance under
this theory, as it was made by a bystander. It could be excluded
under the spontaneous declaration theory, in New York, because it
was made by a bystander. Also it might be urged that it was made
too long after the shooting had occurred. This raises the question as
to whether subsidiary acts, which are exciting in themselves, can give
rise to spontaneous exclamations which are admissible under this
theory. Cannot such events, not themselves the one upon which the
case hinges (such as the hunt for the criminal in the case in hand), give
rise to exciting conditions prompting exclamations which are admis-
sible under the spontaneous declaration doctrine? The court seems,
however, to have admitted the statement as being a statement which
was an issuable fact. While this, the first class mentioned in the
Del Vermo case, might be thought to be erroneously considered as res
geso (as it is not hearsay), since it has so been classified, to now
attempt to change it would give rise to confusion and doubt.
C. F. Reavis, Jr., '19.
Insurance: Construction of the contract.--"Active service" as
construed in a life insurance contract means actual service before the
enemy. This was held in Redd v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 207
S. W. (Kan.) 74 (1918). The application for insurance read: "Active
service in the army or navy, in time of war, shall invalidate said con-
tract of insurance, unless a permit for such service shall have been
applied for * * *." The insured enlisted in time of war as a pri-
vate in the medical department of the army and while at a training
camp died of pneumonia. He had neglected to notify the company of
his enlistment, and it sets this up as a defense in an action to recover
the insurance. The court seeks definition in the New Standard Dic-
tionary and finds active service defined as "(i) In garrison or at sea
in time of peace; (2) before an enemy in time of war," and in the New
Century Dictionary as "the performance of duty against the enemy,
or operations carried on in his presence." Adopting those definitions
as its own, the court decides that the insured was not in active service.
It is the opinion of Ellison, P. J., dissenting, that to carry the phrase
"active service" to the extent suggested at the argument would require
the soldiers to be in acttal combat, and would strain the meaning to
the point of absurdity. He points out that this would exclude mem-
bers of the noncombatant branches of the service from any claim to
active service. It is to be wondered at just what stage of the past war
one entered active service under such a definition. Was it at the
point of embarkation? The soldier would not be" before the enemy,"
but the marine danger might constitute the presence of the enemy so
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as to satisfy the definition of the Century Dictionary. Would service
on the other side of the Atlantic be classed as before the enemy, or
must the trenches be entered? The aviation camps on this side are
not "before the enemy," but the danger contemplated by the contract
is surely present. The field for a variety of facts is large, and it is
doubtful if the courts would pursue the definitions upon which the
holding in this case was based to the logical conclusion suggested by
Judge Ellison. Upon the facts of the present case there could well
be a difference of opinion. Webster's Dictionary gives as one defini-
tion of active service, "service upon the active list." Issue could be
taken with the other dictionaries relied upon in their definition of the
phrase, in view of the varied popular usage The army and navy dis-
tinguish between active duty and inactive duty, the latter referring to
one having been enrolled but not called to a station and under disci-
pline. A like distinction might be drawn between active and inactive
service by similitude of words. The changed mode of living, the
unaccustomed hardships, the possibility of compulsory submission to
inexperienced medical care, should all be taken into consideration in
determining the intent of the contractug parties. The contract is
construed most strongly in favor of the insured, which is so well known
a rule as to need no citation. The case is an addition in support of the
long established principle.
L. W. Dawson, '19.
Master and Servant: Workman's Compensation Act: Liability
of employer for injuries to a discharged employee.-In Whalen v.
Stanwood Towing Co., I86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 19o (I919), the captain
of a tug-boat having been discharged for coming to work in an intoxi-
cated condition, immediately returned to the boat to get his belong-
ings, but instead of leaving soon after, he stayed for dinner and later
left the boat. His body was subsequently found in the river. Claim-
'ant sought an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act.' The
court held that, although after the discharge of deceased his employ-
ment within the contemplation of the Act continued a reasonable
length of time to enable him to get his belongings, there being no
proof that he fell from the boat, the evidence was insitfficient to war-
rant compensation as for an injury resulting in the course of the
employnent,.
The adjudged English and American cases on the Acts have laid
down the general principle that a discharged employee is allowed a
reasonable time within which to leave the premises, and that for the
purpose of the Act the actual relationship of master and servant is not
severed until such reasonable time for departure from the employer's
premises has been afforded. 2 The character of an employee is not
lost until such right has been exercised, and the employment continues
while the workman is physically engaged inmaking his exit from the
'Consol. Laws of N. Y., Laws of 1914, Chap. 41, secs. io and 24.
'Barbearyv. Chugg, 112 L. T. Rep. (Eng.) 797 (1915); Lowry v. Sheffield Coal
Co., 24 L. T. R. (Eng.) 142 (1907); Pope v. Mernt and Chapman Derrick and
Wrecking Co., 177 App. Div. (N. Y.) 69 (1917); Booth v. Burnett, 2 Cal. Ind.
Acc. Com. 162 (I915).
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place where he was employed.3 Thus, where a workman was excused
from work by the superintendent because he had been drinking and
when he started to leave fell, receiving injuries, it was held he was
injured within the course of his employment. 4 However, if after dis-
charge the employee chooses to remain on the premises without the
employer's consent, he assumes all risk of injury.' There mustbe no
loitering and unnecessary delays of any kind. Supposing there was
evidence in the instant case that deceased fell from the boat, and not,
as is possible, from the dock, compensation may have been properly
denied on the ground of the unreasonable'delay of the captain in stay-
ing for dinner.
It has been held that when an employee, after being suspended or
discharged, goes to the place of accident in violation of orders,' or in
his own interests and not in the interests of his employer,7 or returns
to the place of employment seeking reinstatement,8 he is not acting in
the course of his employment and the employer is not liable for injuries
sustained by the employee during this time. And so, too, where there
has been a voluntary discontinuance of service prior to the injury, and
the servant is injured while he unduly remains on the premises. 9
Following the general doctrine, it is also established that discharged
employees receiving injuries while going to get their tools,10 or pay,"
or returning from getting them, are injured in the course of their
employment and entitled to the protecton and benefit of the statute.
This also follows as a necessary incident to the term of the employment
and athough the actual relation of master and servant has ceased for
the purpose of service, the duty under the act continues until the
wages are paid and the employee has left the premisesY2 The same
rules applicable to the conduct of the employee in leaving the premises
in case of discharge apply when he returns to receive his pay, or upon
leaving after obtaining it. Thus, it was held that an employee going
in the usual manner for his pay to a place designated by the employer
is performing a service within his employment and if he suffers injury,
the case comes within the operation and effect of the statute."
The general rule that if a workman is injured, by accident while
going to or returning from his work by means over which the employer
has no control, the employer will not be liable to him, 4 seems to apply
also where the workman has been discharged and returns for his pay.
In Ames v. N. Y. Central Railroad Company,' where deceased left the
3Smith v. South Normanton Colliery Co., x K. B. (Eng.) 204 (1903).
4Kiernanv. Friestedt Underpinning Co., 171 App. Div. (N. Y.) 539 (1916).5Greenberg v. Atwood, 38 N. J. L. J. 54 (1915).6Smith v. South Normanton Colliery Co., supra, note 3.
Phillips-v. Williams, 4 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 143 (1911).8Merrit v. North Pacific Steamship Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Ace. Corn. 273 (1915).9Greenberg v. Atwood, supra, note 5.10Molloy v. South Wales Colliery Co., 4 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 65 (1910).
nRiley v. Holland and Sons, (1911) I K. B. 1029; In re Phillips, i Bull, Ohio
Ind. Comm. 49 (1913); Nelsonv. Belfast Corporation, 42 Ir. L. T. (Eng.) 223 (1908).12Molloy v. South Wales Colliery Co., supra, note Io.
"Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Industrial Comm., 165 Wis. 586 (I917).
14Holness v. Mackay, (1899) 2. Q. B. 319; Nolan v. Porter and Sons, 2 B. W. C.
C. (Eng.) lO6 (i909).
'5178 App. Div. (N. Y.) 324 (1917).
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premises of his employer and gained the public highway in safety, but
thereafter went upon dn elevated railroad conducted by same com-
pany for the purpose of catching the train to a certain point to obtain
his pay, and while crossing the tracks was killed, the court held his
employment was not on the line where the accident occurred, but that
he was a mere trespasser and not entitled to compensation.
No specific time is set when an employee returning for his pay may
be said to be within the course of his employment. What constitutes
a reasonable time for such purpose is usually regarded as a question of
fact depending on the particular circumstances of each case.16 Where
an applicant was discharged on Wednesday and returned for her pay
on Friday, which was the customary pay-day, and was injured while
on the premises, the court held the injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. In the language of the court, 7 "'In the
course of the employment' does not mean 'in the course of doing
industrial work.' * * * It does not follow that employment has
ceased when the industrial work of the workman has come to an end.
Both the servant and the master may yet have duties to perform under
the contract of employment which require the workman to come on
the premises to enable them to be performed. * * * He does so
in the course of his employment, and an accident which befalls him
in his so doing arises out of and in the course of his employment."
It is apparent from these principles and illustrations that both the
English and American courts are endeavoring to apply a broad mean-
ing to the phrase "out of and in the course of the employment," and
in so doing to carry out the intent of the legislative bodies to furnish
protection and care for the workman.
Jacob Meadow, '20.
Principal and Agent: Collateral fraud by agent: Proximate
cause. -In Deyo v. Hudson, 225 N. Y. 602 (99), the plaintiffs were
a law firm practising in the city of Binghamton, where the defendants,
a firm of stockbrokers, had a branch office, with Mitchell, as agent, in
charge. Carver, the junior member of the plaintiff firm, opened an
account at the defendants' branch office and speculated on margins,
losing money belonging to the plaintiffs' clients. He confessed to the
senior member of the firm, and his peculations were made good. The
senior partner then interviewed Mitchell, the defendants' agent, and
told him that they were considering retaining Carver in the firm, but
could not do this if he continued to speculate in the defendants' office,
and asked Mitchell to let them know if he returned to do any more
trading, which Mitchell agreed-to do. It appeared that at that very
time Carver was trading at the office and that Mitchell not only aided
him to conceal the fact but on one occasion positively stated to a
member of the plaintiff firm, that he had not resumed trading.
16Riley v. Holland and Sons, supra, note ii.
R-iley v. Holland, supra, note ii. But see Phillips v. Williams, supra, note 7,
where an employee was on the premises a few days after his discharge, without
intention of working, but with intent to settle a dispute about his pay, was held to
be there solely for his own purpose and consequently could not recover compensa-
tion for an injury resulting at that time.
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Plaintiffs sue in deceit to recover the loss that they have sustained
through Carver's defalcations. There is no evidence that the defend-
ants actually authorized their agents to make false representations to
the plaintiffs, or that they subsequently ratified his acts, beyond the
fact that they received the commissions paid by Carver without
knowledge of the fraud practised.
The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, held that such state-
ments were not within the scope of Mitchell's employment; that the
mere receipt of the commissions, without knowledge of the fraud, did
not amount to a ratification; and that independently of these con-
siderations, the false representations of Mitchell were not the proxim-
ate cause of the injury, and that, therefore, no tort action of deceit
would lie.
. Upon the first point, it may be regarded as a settled rule that the
principal is liable in deceit for the fraudulent representations of the
agent, if made within the scope and course of his employment. Where
an agent is authorized to enter into relations with a third party, the
principal is responsible for all representations made by the agent,
which are intended to and do influence the actions of the third party,
while acting in respect to those relations.' The rule would appear to
be that the principal is liable only for representations concerning the
subject matter of the agency, and that where the representations are
concerning something which is not the subject matter of the agency,
they are not within the scope and course of employment, and the
principal is not liable.2 There is an Indiana case,3 however, in which
the court makes the following very broad statement: "Where a
principal authorizes his agent to do a certain thing, he is answerable for
and bound by the acts and representations of his agent in accomplish-
ing that end, even though the agent is guilty of fraud in bringing about
the result. Having given such authority, the principal is responsible
for the fraudulent as well as the fair means used by the agent, if they
are in line of accomplishing the result.' 4  Under this rule the nature
of the fraudulent representations is immaterial, as long as they are "in
line of accomplishing the result." That would include the principal
case, and make Mitchell's representations to the plaintiffs within the
scope of his employment. The passage in question is, however, mere
dictum, as the representations in the case actually were concerning the
subject matter of the agency. No case has been found in which this
very broad doctrine has been applied. It would therefore appear that
the defendants should not be liable. The subject matter of the agency
was the sale of stocks. Had the representations been concerning the
stocks he was selling, and to the party who was buying them, no
doubt the defendant would have been bound. As it was, however,
they were of matters clearly outside the subject matter of the agency,
and will not bind the principal.
'Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. I 17 (i89O); Locke v. Stearns, i Metcalf (Mass.)
560 (184); White v. Sawyer, i6 Gray (Mass.) 586 (x86o); Sandford v. Handy,
23 Wend. (N. Y.) 26o (1840).
22 Mechem, Agency, (2d ed.) sec. 1987, and cases cited.3Wolfe v. Pugh, Ioi Ind. 293 (1884).4Italics are writer's.
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The next point to be considered is whether the receipt of the com-
missions by the defendant would constitute a ratification of the fraud,
they being received in the usual course of business and there being no
actual knowledge of the fraud.5 This is a case where a third party is
bringing suit against the principal, and should be distinguished from
a case where the principal is suing the third party. The general rule
in the former class of cases is that the receiving and retaining of bene-
fits resulting from either the contract,6 or the tort,7 of the agent will
not constitute such ratification as to make the principal liable, as long
as he is ignorant of the representations of the agent, and the benefits
appear to be the results of their normal business transactions. There
is, however, in New York, a line of cases taking the opposite view, and
holding that the principal, though ignorant of the fraud, is liable.8
The theory upon which these cases rest is that "the principal cannot
enjoy the fruits of the bargain without adopting all the instrumentali-
ties employed by the agent in bringing it to a consummation." 9
There is also advanced the doctrine that whatever knowledge the
agent possesses, is imputed to the principal, so that in reality the
principal cannot be said to ratify without knowledge, since he pos-
sesses the knowledge of the agent. The soundness of this doctrine
has been very much questioned, and it would not appear to be the
correct view. The leading text writer on agency has said that "the
general adoption of this view would practically abolish the entire ele-
ment of knowledge in ratification, and is inconsistent with a large
number of cases."'10 The principal case, however, is even stronger for
the defendant than those cited. It is not a case of direct fraud, such
as misrepresentations by the agent to a vendee concerning land which
he was authorized to sell. It is a case of collateral fraud-representa-
tions made to enable Carver, the junior partner to embezzle money so
that he might continue his speculations in the defendants' office, to the
resultant profit of the defendants. The cases most analagous to this
situation are those involving the liability of the principal for collateral
contracts. The principal has been generally held not liable by ratifica-
tion on collateral contracts made by the agent, unless he knew of the
contract. Thus in the New York case of Smith v. Tracy" where an
agent was authorized to sell certain shares of stock, but was not
authorized to make warranties, the principal was held not bound by
the agent's warranties. In Baldwin v. Burrows the court held that
"this responsibility for instrumentalities does not extend to collateral
contracts made by the agent in excess of his actual or ostensible
authority, and not known to the principal at the time of receiving the
proceeds, though such collateral contracts may have been the means
"For a general discussion of ratification without knowledge, see 15 Yale Law
Jour. 331.6See cases cited i Mechem, Agency, (2d ed.) p. 286, note 12.7Fraud of Agent: Colvin v. Peck, 62 Conn. 155 (1892); Nichols v. Brum,
5. Dak. 28 (1888); Keefe v. Sholl, x81 Pa. 9o (1897). Assault by agent: Stein-
man v. Baltimore Laundry Co., io9 Md. 62 (1908). See also supra, note 6.
sBennet v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 (i86o); Krum v. Beach, 96 N. Y. 398 (1884);
Green v. Des Garets, 21o N. Y. 79 (1913).
gBennet v. Judson, supra, note 8.
10i Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) p. 298.
"Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79 (1867).
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by which the agent was enabled to effect the authorized contract.
* * * ."2 Also in the case of Wheeler v. The North Western Sleigh
Co., 3 where an agent empowered to sell stock also contracted to sell a
dividend which had been declared but not yet paid, the principal was
not held liable for non-assignment of the dividend. It has even been
held that the retention of the benefits by the principal after he has
obtained knowledge of the unauthorized acts, does not amount to a
ratification in certain cases. 14 It would seem that there is at least as
much reason for holding the principal not liable for collateral fraud as
there is in the cases of collateral contracts. The liability of the prin-
cipal for unauthorized acts must cease somewhere, and it would
appear that the decision of the court in this case was the correct one,
both on principle and in the light of decided cases.
The last point in the case is the question of causation. Was the
fraud practised by Mitchell the legal cause of the injury to the defend-
ant? The law upon this question of causation has always been in some
confusion, and several theories have been advanced from time to time
in the hope of clearing up the question and providing a fixed rule for
the determination of future cases. A brief review of these theories
may not be amiss.
The first conception of a legal cause was a causa sine qua non, the
well-known "but for" rule. This test or rule makes the defendant's
tort the legal cause of the plaintiff's damage if, but for the commission
of the defendant's tort, the damage would not have happened. The
rule when applied as a sole test of causation, is unsound.'" The fact
that the damage would not have happened but for the commission of
the defendant's tort does not invariably justify the conclusion that the
tort was the legal cause of the damage. The converse of this proposi-
tion, however, is always true-that a defendant is not liable, unless
it be true that, but for his tortious acts, the damage would not have
happened.' 6
The second of these theories is the "last wrongdoer rule," to the
effect that the legal cause of the damage is the last culpable human
actor to be found in the chain of antecedents. This rule works out
well in many instances, but is inconsistent with the theory of exhaus-
tion, brought out in several cases, to the effect that a wrongful act
may spend itself, the force set in motion being exhausted before.the
"Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. ig9 (1872).
"Wheeler v. The North Western Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (1889). See also
Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219 (186o) and Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399
(1866).
'The retention by the principal, after he has obtained knowledge of the un-
authorized acts of his agent, of the benefits of the transaction, does not amount to
a ratification in case the reason for their failure to return is that their identity is
lost. Schutz v. Jordan, 32 Fed. 55 (1887); or that the property received has been
disposed of so that it has become impossible or useless to return it. Humphrey v.
Havens, 12 Minn. 196 (1867); or that it cannot now be returned without loss to
the principal. Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84 (1846).
"This rule, however, was applied in the charge to the jury in Gilman v. Noyes,
57 N. H. 627 (1876).
16Taylor v. City of Yonkers, io5 N. Y. 202 (1887); Ayres v. Village of Ham-
mondsport, 13o N. Y. 665 (i89i); Grant v. The Pennsylvania and New York
Canal and Railroad Co., 133 N. Y. 657 (1892).
"Fleming v. Beck, 48 Pa. 3o9 (1864).
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happening ofthe damage. There are also cases involving two wrong-
doers, both of whom may be sued by the injured party, and both being
the legal cause of the damage. This rule has been criticised on the
grounds just above stated. 8
A third rule is the "substantial factor rule." Is the act of the
defendant a substantial factor in producing the injury to the plaintiff?
If so it is the legal cause. To be the substantial factor it is not neces-
sary that it be the sole factor, nor even the predominant factor. It
must continue up to the time of the injury to be a "practically active
cause."' 9  This rule undoubtedly is a correct statement of the law, but
is vague and general and correspondingly difficult of application.
The last and most widely accepted rule is the "probable consequence
rule." A wrongdoer is liable for all injuries which are the natural or
probable consequences, or, as some courts put it, "the reasonably for-
seeable results" of his act. This is the view accepted by the courts of
New York State,20 not, however, without making certain arbitrary
exceptions, notably in the case of damage resulting from fire, caused
by the defendant's negligence.21 This, then, is the test to be applied
in the instant case: Were the peculations and embezzlement of the
plaintiffs' money the natural or probable result of the fraudulent
statements made by Mitchell? If so, the act of Mitchell is the legal
cause. The decisions of the courts as to what may or may not be the
probable consequences of an act, fall into several divisions, governed
by the following propositions.
In the first place, in the case of any distinct legal wrong, which per
se constitutes an invasion of the rights of another, the law will presume
that damage follows as a natural, necessary, and proximate result.
Thus, action will lie for a battery, although no damages are shown.12
The samhe is true of trespass.2 Also, damages resulting from a bat-
tery which might seem highly improbable, may be recovered for.2
The second of these propositions is-that where the act or omission is
not a distinct wrong, actionable per se, and can only become a wrong
to any particular individual through injurious consequences, it must
appear from the evidence to have resulted therefrom according to the
ordinary course of events.25 Thus, in the case of Fairbanks v. Smith
where the defendant was making a speech in the streets, and a pile of
stones upon which some of the crowd were standing gave way, it was
held that the injuries were not the naturalAresult of the defendant's
speech, and he was therefore not liable.2
18See article by Professor Smith, 25 Harv. Law Rev. 112, 113.1925 Harv. Law Rev. 103, 223, 303.20Jex v. Straus, 122 N. Y. 293 (i89o); Hall v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 214 N. Y.
49 (i915); Lowery v. Western Mutual Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 198 (1875). It
is also the view advocated by Sir Frederick Pollock, I Pollock, Torts, (ioth ed.)
p. 32. Contra, Christianson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Minn. 94 (1896);
Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158 (1883); Isham v. Estate of Dow, 70 Vt. 588 (1898).21Ryan, v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210 (186o); somewhat modified by
Hoffman v. King, 16o N. Y. 618 (1899).22Cole v. Turner, 6 Modern Rep. (Eng.) 149 (704).23Dougherty v. Stepp, i Dev. & Battle (N. C.) 371 (1835).24Vosburg & Putney, 80 Wis. 253 (1891). "2
-Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East (Eng.) i (18o6); Dubuque Wood and Coal Ass. v.
Dubuque, 3o Ia. 176 (2870); Losee v. Clute, 5i N. Y. 494 (873).26Fairbanks v. Smith, 70 Pa. 86 (1871).
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The third and fourth propositions have to do with a condition that
is present in the principal case, i. e., with the effect of an intervening
act by a third party. They are as follows: If the original act was
wrongful and would naturally, according to the ordinary course of
events, prove injurious to some other persons, and injury occurs
through the intervention of some other causes which are not wrongful,
the injury shall be referred to the wrongful cause, passing by those
which were innocent. The leading case involving this set of facts is
Scott v. Shepherd, the famous "squib case,"2' where the defendant
threw a lighted squib in the midst of a crowd of people, and each per-
son threw it from him, in self defense, until it exploded, to the plain-
tiff's injury. The court referred back to the wrongful act as the
cause, passing by the innocent acts of the other parties, although they
were nevertheless a part of the causation of the plaintiff's injury.
There is a long line of American cases to the same effect. 28 If, on the
other hand, the original wrong only becomes injurious in consequence
of the intervention of some distinct wrongful act or omission by
another, the injury shall be imputed to the last wrong as the proximate
cause. 2 9  Thus in Lowery v. The Western Mutual Telegraph Co.,30
where the defendant by mistake wired $5000, instead of $5oo from the
plaintiff to B, his agent, and B absconded, it was held that B's act,
not the defendant's, was the proximate cause, and that the defendant
was not liable.
Applying these principles to the case at hand it will be readily seen
that the fraud of the defendant's agent is not the legal cause of the
plaintiff's injury. False representations are not per se an actionable
wrong; there must be injury shown to make out a cause of action.
The injury in this case, however, occurred in consequence of the dis-
tinct wrongful act of Carver, without which there would have been no
loss to the plaintiff. The defendant, in such a case, should not be
held to forsee a criminal act by a third party, in consequence of which
his own act would become injurious.3' The case was correctly
decided.
Lansing S. Hoskins '20.
Statute of Frauds: One year clause: Oral contract for a year's
service to begin the following day.-In the case of Prokop v. Bedford
Waist and Dress Co., 1o5 Misc. (N. Y.) 573 ('919), the facts were
that the plaintiff had been in the employ of the defendant for two
weeks, on trial, and on Saturday, Sept. 22, before noon, the defendant
said to the plaintiff, "I want a man for the whole year. You will have
2Scott v. Shephered, 3 Wils. (Eng.) 403 (1773).
"
8Guille v. Swan, i9 Johns. (N. Y.) 381 (1822); Henry v. Dennis, 93 Ind. 452
(1883); Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 464 (1847); Laidlaw v. Sage,
x58 N. Y. 73 (1899).29Vicars v. Wilcocks, supra, note 25; Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413 (1856);
Lowery v. Western Mutual Telegraph Co., supra, note 20; Hall v. N. Y. Tele-
phone Co., 214 N. Y. 4 9 (1915); Jex v. Straus, supra, note 2o; Clifford v. Atlantic
Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47 (1888). But see Fottler v. Moseley, 185 Mass. 563
(1904).30Lowery v. Western Mutual Telegraph Co., supra, note 20.3 Lowery v. Western Mutual Telegraph Co., supra, note 20.
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the whole year a job with me; you go ahead." The plaintiff con-
tinued work for the remainder of the forenoon and did some work in
the afternoon. He remained in the defendant's employ until dis-
charged, in March, igi8, and thereupon broughtaction for breach of
his contract of employment.
There was some evidence that the year of labor was to begin
immediately upon the making of the agreement. Had such been the
fact, it is clear that the statute would not apply. The plaintiff had,
however, alleged that work was not to begin under the contract until
the following Monday. Disregarding Sunday as a working day, a
question was thus presented whether an oral contract for services for
a year, work to begin on the following day, was unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds; of which sec. 31, subd. i, reads: "Every
agreement * * * is void unless it be in writing, if such agreement:
i. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the mak-
ing thereof." The court in the principal case held that such a con-
tract is not within the statute and assigned the following reasons:
First, even granting that it were established that labor was to be per-
formed for a full year from and including the day after the contract
was made, still, the law in computing the time, would disregard the
fraction of the day remaining and regard the following day as the first
day of the contract.' Second, since under many contracts for labor,
the work is to begin the following day, to hold a contract such as the
above unenforceable would be to prohibit the enforcement of many
oral contracts to labor for a year; a result, the court says, that was
clearly not intended by the framers of the statute.
The authorities on the precise point in question are few and unsatis-
factory. The question has arisen in only one state besides New York,
but there are a few English cases. In Cawthorne v. Cordrey2 there is an
-erroneous headnote to the effect that an oral contract for labor, to
begin the next day and continue for a year, is within the statute. The
,case, however, reveals that it was decided on an entirely different
ground. This headnote has been followed in later decisions which
consequently cannot be given much weight. There were, however,
some dicta in the Cawthorne case, which were not in harmony with the
headnote and have been followed in later decisions. Willes, J., said
in that case, "If a builder undertakes to build a house within a year,
that means a year from the next day." And Byles, J., remarked, "If
you adopt the reasonable rule which excludes fractions of a day, * * *
there would be only 365 days."
The later English case of Smith v. Gold Coast and Ashanti Explorers,
Ltd.,3 expressly approved these dicta in the Cawthorne case, above
quoted, and the favorable comment thereon by Brett, J., in Britain v.
Rossiter,4 and added that the question there suggested had now arisen
for decision. The court then held that, "A contract for a year's ser-
vice to commence on the day next after the day on which the contract
'People v. New York Central R. R. Co., 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 284 (858). "In the
computation of time under a statute, the day from which a specified number of
days is to be counted is to be excluded * * *
213 C. B. (N. S.) (Eng.) 406 (1863).
31 K. B. (Eng.) 285 (1903).4L. R. ii Q. B. D. (Eng.) 123 (,879).
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was made, is not an agreement which is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof, within the meaning of the statute,"
the court basing its decision on the rule that the law does not regard
fractions of a day.
The first case in this country was that of Dickson v. Frisbee,5 where
the court reached exactly the same result as did the case just stated,
basing its decision on the same reasons. In New York the cases of
Levison v. Stix,6 Billington v. Cahill,7 and Jonap v. Preger,8 were the
only cases previous to the principal case. These were all decided
upon the strength of the erroneous headnote in the Cawthorne case,
following that rule.
The court in the principal case did not feel bound by any of the
previous New York cases on the point involved. The result reached
accords fully with modern contractual practices and is also within the
spirit and intent of the statute. It is also in accord with the result
reached in England and Alabama, the only other jurisdiction from
which there have been cases reported on this point.
Section 20, of the New York General Construction Law, reads in
part as follows: "In computing any specified period of time from a
specified event, the day upon which the event happens is deemed the
day from which the reckoning is made. The day from which any
specified period of time is reckoned 'shall be excluded in making the
reckoning." Although this statute apparently has to do only with the
computation of time, and is not directly applicable to the problem
involved in the principal case, it is an illustration of the tendency in
the law to disregard fractions of days. A further illustration of this
same tendency is to be found in the decisions to the effect that a person
becomes of age on the day before his twenty-first birthday.9
W. B. Daley, Jr., '20.
Unfair Competition: Application to news service.--The Associated
Press is a co6perative association organized for the purpose of gather-
ing news and transmitting it to the members of the association at cost.
The International News Service is a corporation organized for the pur-
pose of gathering news and transmitting it to any one who will pay
for the service. The Associated Press brought suit in the District
Court of the United States to restrain the International News Service
from pirating news which it had gathered, first, by bribing employees
of members of the association to divulge such news before publication,
second, by inducing members of the association to violate its rules and
by-laws and disclose the news before publication, and finally by copy-
ing news from the bulletins and early editions of Associated Press news-
papers after publication. That the first two practices were clearly
enjoinable there was little doubt, but to give the injunction any real
force, it was necessary for plaintiff to secure a favorable decision as to
the last method as well as the first two, because the City of New York
552 Ala. x65 (1876).
6Io Daly (N. Y.) 229 (1881).
751 Hun. (N. Y.) 132 (1889).
859 Misc. (N. Y.) I87 (1go8).9Spencer, Law of Domestic Relations, sec. 538
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is the distributing center for practically all foreign news and much
domestic news, and due to the time differentials between the east and
west, news, although already published in New York, if copied early
enough might be telegraphed or telephoned west and reach its destina-
tion while it was still early enough for newspaper purposes. There-
fore, an injunction which failed to cover the third form of the defend-
ant's predatory activities would fail to remedy the wrong at which it
was directed. The District Court granted an injunction as to the first
two practises, but left the third method to the outcome of an appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals which ordered an injunction to be issued
in conformity with the plaintiff's entire prayer.' The appeal to the
Supreme Court2 was solely upon the third point, namely, whether the
defendant might rightfully be enjoined from copying the plaintiff's
news after publication.
The defendant's contention was that after publication all property
rights in uncopyrighted literary matter and particularly in news is
lost, that the production is dedicated to the public and may be used by
any one.' In this view they seemed to have some support in decided
cases. In Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain (Y Stock Com-
pany4 the plaintiff had the exclusive right to collect produce exchange
quotations. These they transmitted to persons under special con-
tractual relations to them. The defendant induced one of these per-
sons to disclose to him the quotations as they came over the ticker,
and plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendant from obtaining
the information by inducing a breach of contract. In National Tele-
graph News Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company,' the facts
were essentially the same. The court in both cases granted the injunc-
tion, their decision turning upon the fact that the imparting of informa-
tion to one in contractual relations with the plaintiff did not constitute
publication. Thus in the Board of Trade case the court said that the
plaintiff did not lose "its property rights in quotations by communica-
ting them to certain persons, even though many in confidential and
contractual relations to itself" and in the second case, "where A
furnishes news to its customers who are under contractual relations
with it-it cannot thereby be said to have published such news."
The implication from such statements is that where there is publica-
tion an injunction would not be granted. In the principal case, there
was no element of inducement of breach of contract, there was no
violation of property rights and there had been publication.6 The
court, however, in affirming the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals
waved these considerations aside and placed their decision squarely
upon the ground of unfair competition-"we need spend no time,
however, upon the general question of property in news matter at
1245 Fed. Rep. 244 (1917).
2248 U. S. 215 (1918).
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82 (1899); Taft v. Snith, Gray & Co., 76 Misc.
(N. Y.) 283 (1912); I3 Corp. Jur. 946, 976 and cases cited; Cooley, Law of Torts(2d. ed.) p. 417.
4198 U. S. 236 (I9O5).
51 9 Fed. 294 (1902).6For definition of publication as used in the present connection see D'Ole v.
Kansas City Star Co., 94 Fed. 840, 842 (1899); Associated Press v. Intern'l News
Service, supra, note i.
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common law-since it seems to us the case must turn upon the ques-
tion of unfair competition in business."
Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition must be
determined with particular reference to the character and circum-
stances of the business, but an examination of texts on the subject of
unfair competition will disclose that the application of the doctrine
in the principal case is novel to the doctrine as conceived by legal
writers. Unfair competition has been regarded as an inherent, inte-
gral part of the general rules with regard to the infringement of trade
marks and trade names. Thus in Cyc the subject is treated merely
as part of the general discussion of Trade Marks and Trade Names.
Singer, on The Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Trade, is merely a
digest of the laws of various countries with regard to the protection of
Trade Marks, and Nims, on Unfair Competition and Trade Marks,
is almost entirely a discussion of the law of trade marks. Where
unfair competition is regarded as being something other than the
infringement of trade marks its connection is disclosed by its defini-
tion, "Unfair competition consists in passing off or attempting to pass
off upon the public the goods or business of one person as and for the
goods or business of another.8 Before the principal case, therefore,
the conception of unfair competition was clearly defined as either an
infringement of trade mark or in general such action as would enable
one to deceive the public and pass off upon them one's own goods
under the representation that they were actually the goods of one's
competitor. Unfair competition, as thus defined, has no application
to the principal case, but the court by seizing upon and emphasizing
the force of the word "unfair" has basically altered the conception of
the doctrine. Unfair competition by the interpretation given it
actually means what its name indicates, and infringement of trade
marks has been relegated to its proper position as merely one of the
forms which this wrong may assume. Thus cases like Lumely v.
Gye9 holding it actionable for one person to induce another to break
his contract with a business competitor, might well be considered as
illustrating and representing an application of the doctrine of unfair
competition. In the famous case of the Mogul Steamship Company v.
McGregor0 the plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for com-
bining to cut prices unreasonably and thus drive him out of business.
The decision of the court turned upon whether the defendants wereactuated by motives of economic self-advancement or primarily by
the desire to injure the plaintiff, in other words, was the competitionfair or unfair. In Tuttle v. Buck n the defendant, a wealthy banker, ina spirit of animosity toward the plaintiff, a barber, set up and financed
a competing shop to the damage of the plaintiff. The court was facedwith the problem of granting reparation for injury where the acts were
not wrongful and would clearly not be actionable if done by any one
f 8 oof Law and Proe. 56  p. 2-, ntais td e iUnfair Competition, (2dfrom adjudicated cases all to the same effect. See also Rogers, Good Will, TradeMark and Unfair Trade, and Hopkins, The Law of Unfair Trade.
92 E. and B. (Eng.) 216 (1853).
10(1892) App. Cas. (Eng.) 25.
n1o7 Minfi. 1145 (1909).
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else, the only wrongful element being the motive actuating the defend-
ant. The action was sustained under the notion of unfair competi-
tion. "To call such conduct competition is a perversion of terms."
It is to the field of decisions such as the above that the principal case
has directed attention as explicable upon the underlying theory of
unfair competition.
The courts of equity have always refused to define fraud and have
consequently held in their hands a strong weapon against uncon-
scientious dealing, and it is eminently fitting that a doctrine which by
its very name makes unfairness of dealing its basis should similarly be
free from narrow definition and so interpreted as to enable the courts
to cope with unfair and parasitical business practices.
Mr. Nims, in his book on Unfair Competition says,'2 "It is now seen
that these rights [to the fruits of one's labor] whether property or not,
are entitled to protection and it very well may be that in the future,
acts of unfair competition will be regarded neither as injurious to
property nor as torts, strictly speaking, but rather as acts unfair to
both the public and the plaintiff, hence inequitable and therefore
actionable." The International News Service v. Associated Press has
amply satisfied this prophesy and has at the same time given the
courts the legal means of keeping pace with the ever increasing public
demand for higher business ethics.
Benjamin Pepper, '2o.
12P. 17.
